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CHAPTER 8

The Blogosphere and
the Public Sphere

A s is to be expected after a technological or social innovation
in communication occurs, there has already been a great deal of
rumination about the influence ofblogs on the public's discussion of
issues, events, and policy questions. It would be an interesting project
- but beyond the scope of this work - to analyze the major
viewpoints on blogs and the public discourse, with an eye for the
social group in which those viewpoints are the conventional wisdom:
say, among news professionals, among academicians, among bloggers, .
and in the general public. Here, it is enough simply to note that the
estimations ofblogs' impact and value, potential or already realized,
range from laudatory (e.g., Bennett, 2005; Hewitt, 2005; Leo, 2004)
to derogatory (e.g., Engberg, 2004; Rall, 2005; Parker, 2005;
Zerbisias, 2004). There are two major bodies of work in the scholarly
literature on human communication behavior which will be helpful in
bringfug some clarity to this tumult. To that end it will be useful to
approach the question of blogs' impact on the public discourse with
regard to both quantity (as the participation in the discourse) and
quality (as the value of the contributions to the overall good).
Over the course of a number of works, Jiirgen Habermas
painstakingly built the case for a level playing field in public talk
about issues and events, and outlined features such a discourse would
need to embody. This body of work is essentially normative, a
conceptual exploration of an ideal public sphere. Elisabeth
Noelle-Neumann identified a social dynamic in which individuals who
disagree with what they take to be a majority opinion find themselves
reluctant to give expression to that disagreement. In contrast, her body
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of work is essentially descriptive, an empirical inquiry into an existing
public sphere. While much different in their scholarly foundations,
their derivation, and their implications, both of these well-known
works offer insights into blogs as a feature ofthe social landscape.
The connection between these seemingly disparate theories, the
ideal speech situation of Habermas and the spiral of silence of
Noelle-Neumann, is that both deal with public discussion of issues of
public concern. In Habermas we fmd a description of a beneficent
communication environment in which this discussion can take place,
an environment in which there is institutional support for a
constructive discussion - that is, a practical means by which
individuals can take part in the discussion- and group norms for
speech acts which foster participation in that discussion space. In
Noelle-Neumann we·find the effects which individuals' perceptions of
that discussion space tend to have on their own willingness to
contribute to the discussion. It will be useful to frrst summarize the
main ideas in these two bodies of work which offer insights into the
blogosphere: Habermas, regarding the blogosphere as a discourse, and
Noelle-Neumann, regarding blogs as a mass communication medium.

The Ideal Speech Situation
Habermas 's notion of a practical discourse - the substantive
public discussion of some issue - boils down to group decisionmaking by a process of argumentation. One characteristic in particular
is crucial to this process: that there be no coercion bearing on the
interested parties, other than the relative strength of the arguments
themselves. His expectation, under that condition, is that any
self-interested behaviors (such as manipulation, intimidation, or
misrepresentation, for instance) will effectively be cancelled out,
resulting in a "cooperative search for truth" (1990, pp. 88-89). ·
What might at first glance seem to be a naively optimistic- or
otherwise problematic - view of actual human motivations and
behaviors in a dispute, gets mapped onto a concise set of operating
rules, which Habermas (1990, p. 89) credits to Robert Alexy (1990,
pp. 166-167). Those operating rules for an ideal speech situation can
be paraphrased along these lines: ( 1) Anybody can participate in the
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discussion; (2) Every participant can raise any question, make any
assertion, or express any feeling; and (3) No interference with
another's participation is allowable.
By themselves, these rules would seem to invite chaos; is any
string of words which anybody wants to inject into a discussion
allowable, under the rules for an ideal situation? The short answer is
no, because there is a qualifier- which, for the sake of parsimony,
disappeared in this author's paraphrase- attached to the first rule.
Any competent speaker (1990, p. 89) can participate; competent
speakers are those who make comments falling into three defined
classes, regarding their potential effect on the discussion (Habermas,
1990, p. 137, ff.; Farrell, 1993, p. 189, ff.). These three classes do
impose constraints on the participants, and thus maintain some degree
of order in the discussion. A constative concerns truth, in the sense of
statements about real things in the real world. Assertions of fact or
disputes about fact would fall in this category. A representative
concerns the feelings of the speaker, and expressions of sincerity or
intent would fall in this category. A regulative, as the label suggests,
has to do with the acceptability of particular behavior, in this case,
participation in a discussion. We can see a rough correspondence,
then, between the constative and representative categories and the
second rule, and the regulative category and the third rule. So while
the three discourse rules, taken in isolation, are inadequate as a norm
for an ideal discussion, this classification of competent speech acts
provides sufficient additional constraint on what people might do in
the discussion space.
In sum, the discussion is open to all who wish to join it, and to
whatever constructive contribution they might wish to make to it.
Hopefully the discussion will lead to a "rationally motivated
recognition" of the best ideas (Habermas, 1975, p. 107), the quality of
which is "grounded in the consensus of the participants through
argumentation" (1975, p. 105). Regarding the overall beneficence of
the collective decision process, "equal consideration [is] given to the
interests of every individual in defming the general interest" (1990, p.
203). In effect, the ideal speech situation is Darwinian: the fittest ideas
prevail, because they are based on the strongest arguments, which are
the arguments most persuasive, and hence most acceptable, to the
participants.
Watching the Watchdog
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This model is very much in keeping with two famous passages in
United States Supreme Court opinions. Justice William Brennan's
majority opinion in the Times v. Sullivan case ( 1964) rested largely on
what he described as "a profound national commitment to the
principle that debate on public issues should be uninhibited, robust,
and wide-open." It seems fair to say that this passage has since been
accepted as a regulative, itself, regarding the way public issues will be
addressed in the public discussion space. Participation is
presumptively open, as the large number of First Amendment
decisions have repeatedly affirmed. Correspondingly, restrictions on
speech are relatively few and require strong justification of some sort.
In short, the operating principle Brennan affirmed is very much in
keeping with the three discourse rules in Habermas' s ideal.
The conception of a reasoned consensus as the outcome of the
discourse- or, at least, the acceptance of any decision finally reached
-brings to mind Oliver Wendell Holmes's dissent in Abrams et al.
v. U.S. (1919). This opinion is the source ofthe marketplace of ideas
metaphor, although those exact words do not themselves appear in the
dissent. Of interest here is Holmes's thought on how a public debate
can best arrive at truth, a topic Habermas has also considered at length.
In dissenting from the majority opinion that the Espionage Act of
1917, as amended in 1918, did not infringe on the First Amendment
with its prohibition of language disparaging the government, Holmes
wrote that "the ultimate good desired is better reached by free trade in
ideas - that the best test of truth is the power of the thought to get
itself accepted in the competition of the market." Clearly this is the
kind of argumentation leading to a mutual recognition of the best
ideas, which Habermas identified as the goal of a public discussion.
The slang expression, "I'll buy that," meaning "I accept the truth of
that," is a reminder of the pervasiveness of Holmes's metaphor.
Nonetheless there are a few issues with Habermas's conception
of an ideal speech situation which will be relevant to our analysis of
web logs, and we should note them at this point. One question concerns
the overall beneficence of the discourse. The first rule holds that the
discussion must be open to participation, so that whatever decisions
are reached will take all stakeholders' interests into account. As an
ethical matter, this would seem intuitively obvious. But as a practical
matter- a real operating rule for a real discussion in the real world
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STEPHEN

D.

COOPER

- the question of the boundary of the "communication community"
(Habennas, 1975, p. I 05) will inevitably arise, unless one considers
every discussion prima facie to be open, on an equal footing, to every
human being on the planet. This is not just a matter of logistics or
networking, either, as the legitimacy of the discourse - that is, the
degree to which it is binding on real people in the real world- relies
on its openness to participation, and its ability to extend beyond the
confines of its immediate time and space limitations (as in Habermas,
1990, p. 202). Since computer-mediated communication has largely
erased time and space as practical constraints on individuals' ability
to take part in discussions, whatever they might have to contribute to
it, the question of whether a discourse's legitimacy is a function of its
inclusiveness becomes all the more salient.
Related to this is the notion of consensus, which provides the
philosophical grounding for whatever decisions might be reached
through the discussion. It is the consensus, reached through a process
of argumentation, which validates those decisions, and which, in
effect, creates the value of the decisions (as in Habermas, 1975, p.
I 05). If the real-world communication community cannot simply be
bounded by the human-ness (as opposed to inanimate-ness or
animal-ness) of the participants, then perhaps the boundary is
effectively created by the members' acceptance or rejection of
particular ideas. In that case, the consensus and the boundary are
tautological; those who accept the consensus are members of the
community, and those who do not, are not.
Moreover, what to make of a persistent issue about which no
consensus forms, or about which (given the nature of the matter to be
decided) no consensus could form, for logical reasons? Examples of
such issues are plentiful; abortion, capital ·punishment, welfare
programs, and warfare would be obvious illustrations of important yet
highly polarized issues suggesting no easy route to a consensus. Are
there multiple communication communities, in that case? As a
conceptual solution, that answer would seem to undercut the entire
purpose ofHabermas's ideal speech situation; we would simply go off
in our own comers and talk among ourselves. And perhaps that is
exactly what we often see happening, in the real world.
A similar tautology appears, regarding the qualifier on the first
rule. To be a legitimate discussion, the discourse must be open to all
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competent participants. How would we recognize a competent
participant? His or her speech acts- contributions to the discourse,
in other words - would fall into the three categories of legitimate
speech acts. Very well, then: speech competence, which is the
threshold for participation, and conformity with those categories are
tautological. But if every possible speech act falls into one of the
categories, there is no need for the categories; anything can be said by
anybody at any time. In this case, we have no protection against the
discourse becoming chaotic. On the other hand, if those categories
allow for speech which calls the categories themselves into question,
we may have on our hands the conceptual problem of an infinite
regress.
In fairness, Habennas's model may simply have hit the limit of
how logically elegant a theoretical ideal can be, or, more likely, the
limit of how ideal a truly practical discourse can be; both he (200 1, pp.
102-103) and Alexy (1990, pp. 180-183) seem to acknowledge this
limitation. But the question of how close a functioning, real-world
discussion space can come to the ideal of"equality, universality, and
lack of constraint" (Alexy, 1990, p. 166) will remain. Who, exactly,
must be included, and who can legitimately be excluded? This is a
question at the heart of mainstream media's scorn for the "guy sitting
in his living room in his pajamas," a former CBS executive's
caricature of bloggers (Are Bush Memos Authentic?, 2004; Fund,
2004). If they are competent, the bloggers' speech must be taken as
seriously as that of the professional journalists; only ifbloggers are not
competent can they legitimately be ignored.

The Spiral of Silence
Noelle-Neumann's goal, over the course of empirical work, was
to explain what seemed a strange quirk in people's expressive
behavior. Even when living under a regime which vigorously
protected their right to express opinions on the public questions of the
day, there were circumstances under which people would be quite
reluctant to do so, either verbally or with such visual devices as
buttons or burnperstickers. She named this social dynamic the spiral
of silence (1993), since the model includes both ongoing social
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interactions and individual actions.
The essence of the spiral of silence model is that people make
comparisons of their individual perspective on a public issue, and their
sense of the general public opinion on that issue. Needless to say, they
are aware of their own opinions; they base their idea of public opinion,
as a collective mindset, on mass-mediated news reporting. When those
two opinions diverge significantly, a built-in fear of isolation or
exclusion leads an individual holding a minority opinion to refrain
from expressing it ( 1993, pp. 20 1-202). This comparison is not a
snapshot, or static comparison, however; people derive a dynamic
sense of which opinions - or behaviors - are gaining or declining
in acceptance among the general population from their own exposure
to mass-mediated content. This comparison, in tum, influences their
own expressive activity; they become more ready to give expression
to their opinions, in both public and private situations, when they see
a rising trend in the fit between their opinions and that of the general
public, and more reluctant when they see a declining trend (1993, p.
202). In short, an individual's expressiveness is influenced by his/her
agreement or disagreement with what seems to that person to be the
dominant opinion. As Noelle-Neumann puts it, colorfully, "feeling in
harmony with the spirit of the age loosens the tongue" (1993, p. 26).
In essence, Noelle-Neumann is pointing to a social control
mechanism, although not a kind of control which has been deliberately
built into the social system, or one which is instantiated in law or
regulation. Hence, the paradox that people living under a social system
which guarantees their rights of expression may often feel inhibited
about expressing themselves. Put another way, this model explains a
subtle and decentralized pressure to conform, to be nonassertive in
one's expressions, and Noelle-Neumann says flatly that this form of
indirect social control is, in fact, more powerful in shaping people's
actual expressions and behaviors than such overt controls as law and
regulation (1993, p. 130). In short, individuals' desire for social
acceptability, and the benefits which come from social acceptability,
may tend to outweigh their expressive needs. Noelle-Neumann is
careful to point out that this is not a simplistic causal model; it is not
the case that people's expressive behaviors are determined by others.
Rather, there is a tension between conformity and individualism, the
need to be accepted by others - or, at least, to avoid becoming
Watching the Watchdog
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isolated (see 1993, p. 6 on this point)- and the need to be a human
agent, in one's own regard (1993, p. 41); clearly, individuals differ in
their personal negotiations of this tension, but nonetheless this is the
crucial point of contact between the individual and society as a whole
(1993, p. 229).
It is also important to note, in the spiral of silence model, the role
of mediated communication. Ordinary people do not conduct their
own opinion polls or any other kind of scientific measurements of
general public opinion. Rather, they form a native sense of public
opinion from the mediated information to which they are exposed.
While people certainly learn about others' thinking through their
face-to-face interactions in the daily routine, mediated content is the
greatest source of individuals' sense of events beyond their own
observation, and likewise, of public opinion beyond their direct
experience (1993, p. 217). Hence, the fidelity of those media products
to the actual opinions held by members of the public is of consequence
in this dynamic public/personal calculus; along that line,
Noelle-Neumann mentions some interesting examples of perceived
public opinion distorted by news reporting. It is here that the ongoing
discussion of media bias has relevance.
We should likewise take note of some issues with the spiral of
silence theory, which will be relevant to an analysis of web logs. An
individual's fear of isolation, perhaps even outright stigma, is the
driving force behind the scaled-up social dynamic of the spiral of
silence. While Noelle-Neumann provides a good amount of evidence
for accepting this fear ofis_olation as an inherent trait in human beings,
we need to note that individuals will differ markedly in this trait. That
is to say, there are obviously individuals who are at the conformist end
of the scale, in terms of their personal need for social acceptance, and
others who are clearly at the nonconformist end of it. Moreover, there
are plentiful examples of celebrities who gained some measure of their
notoriety by deliberately exhibiting some sort of nonconformity.
Ironically enough, we can think of their social acceptance (manifest as
celebrity) as being the product of a calibrated degree ofnonconfomity!
The point here is that this trait ought not be overestimated, as a
determinant of people's behaviors, even as it seems a strong
explanation of a particular influence on their public expressions.
Another caution to be observed is that mediated content is
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probably not the only influence on an individual's sense of public
opinion. In the media effects literature, the two-step flow (Katz &
Lazarsfeld, 1955, p. 309 ff.; Lazarsfeld, Berelson, & Gaudet, 1968, pp.
151-152) was noted early on: the influence of mass-mediated content
on an individual is, itself, mediated by people with whom that
individual is in face-to-face contact. Moreover, a certain degree of
skepticism about the accuracy of opinion polling, as reported in the
news media, seems to have set in, among the general population. At
the least, we should keep in mind, in thinking about blogs as a social
system feature, that the analytical move from the level of individual
human being to the level of the society as a whole is not always a
simple, unproblematic move.

The Quantity Question
In short, Habermas and Alexy generated a theoretical ideal of a
communication environment, one which combined institutional
support for arguing about public questions with a shared
understanding of the speech acts which are allowable in that
environment. Here, we are thinking of web logs as the technological
facilitation of a practical means by which individuals are able to join
in that argumentation, and the blogosphere as operating according to
group norms which inhibit participation very little, if at all. In
Noelle-Neumann there are empirically-derived insights into the effect
the existence of such an environment might have on the content of the
argumentation in it.
IfNoelle-Neumann's spiral ofsilence.theory accurately describes
a tendency in the communication behaviors of individual people in the
real world, this tendency clearly has the potential to retard any social
evolution toward Habermas's ideal speech situation. That is to say, if
individuals have an interest in a discussion but are still unwilling to
give expression to their thoughts for fear of social stigma, the
discussion as a whole falls short of that ideal. And while there may be
no coercion in a structural or institutional sense, and there even may
be a legal guarantee of their right to participate, this behavioral
tendency- rooted in human nature, according to Noelle-Neumann
(1993, p. 202) - will clearly inhibit the vigorous assertion and
interrogation dynamic the ideal discourse is predicated upon. Even
Watching the Watchdog
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allowing that Habermas' s ideal is more useful as a vision statement
than as a performance benchmark for actual public discussion, a spiral
of silence dynamic clearly degrades the quality of a discussion.
This concern is a matter of degree, regarding the source of the
inhibition. If individuals are reluctant to participate in a discourse
because they have no substantive contribution to make to it or are
indifferent about the question under discussion, the discourse is not
degraded by their silence, nor are their rights to participate in any way
infringed. But if they want to talk about their own stake in the issue
under discussion - a representative - or if they have a serious
question to raise or serious assertion to make - a constative - or if
they have an objection to another's conduct in the discussion- a
regulative - and are yet inhibited by their fear of isolation as a
consequence of their speech, the discourse is therefore suboptimal.
Web logs are beginning to mitigate the spiral of silence dynamic,
and in that way, taking us a bit closer to the ideal speech situation. One
way they do this by reducing the fear of being isolated. Given the
extraordinary range of opinions expressed in the blogosphere, a blog
reader is likely to find views more or less congruent with his or her
own- as well as views posing challenges to his or her own. In itself,
this counteracts a human's inherent fear of isolation; a reader is likely
to come away from the blogs with the perception that there are other
people out there who have similar questions or perceptions about the
events of the day. In short, blogs reduce the inhibitory effect of public
opinion contrary to an individual's personal viewpoint, by making
evidence readily available through hyperlinking and blogrolling that
one, in fact, is not alone in that viewpoint. And this is the essence of
the blogosphere's challenge to the mainstream media; the conventional
storylines and frames ofthe established journalists no longer constitute
the master narrative of current events; heterodox narratives are viable,
now.
Regardless of the quality of the material in the blogosphere quality measured by such important characteristics as factual accuracy,
logical reasoning, critical insights, or ethical concerns - the sheer
diversity of thought in the blogosphere will blunt the inhibitory effect
of perceived isolation on an individual with a viewpoint on the issues
significantly different from the mainstream media's portrayal of public
opinion. Certainly the quality of the material matters, both to the
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individual and to the public! But the point here is that the wild frontier
ethos of blogs, in itself, encourages participation in a discourse. We
should keep in mind that the Habermas/Alexy rules for an ideal
discourse do not themselves address the quality of the speech acts
made in it; rather, those rules stipulate broad participation and a very
high degree of freedom of expression, with the expectation that,
operationally, bad thinking will be winnowed out and good thinking
will prevail, under the conditions of an ideal speech situation. Further,
the legitimacy of the discourse as public decision-making is predicated
on the willingness of stakeholders to give expression to their own
interests in the issue. Once again, blogs move us closer to the ideal
simply by reducing the inhibitions on participating.
In short, blogs offer readers a much wider range of thinking than
is available in the traditional outlets. Readers can choose material
which either challenges or affirms their personal views on issues and
events. The heterogeneity of the material washes out the relative
conformity of "public opinion" as presented in the traditional
channels. Put another way, blogs, by altering the media mix, have the
potential to alter individuals' perception of the general public opinion.
For a reader with a viewpoint differing from conventional public
opinion, exposure to blogosphere material can counteract the personal
fear of isolation, and thereby lessen the reluctance to give expression,
in one form or another, to that heterodox viewpoint. In that way, blogs
can help an individual negotiate the tension between conformity and
agency.
Another way the blogosphere moves us closer to the ideal
discourse is by providing institutional support for it, albeit a
nontraditional kind of institutional support. Apart from individuals'
willingness to enter a discussion, they need a practical means to do so
(see Habermas, 1990, p. 209 on this point). It seems clear that blogs,
as a social system feature, support the three discourse rules quite
nicely. The first rule concerns the openness of the discourse; anybody
who wishes can create a blog or read material on others' blogs.
Internet connections are readily available, the necessary computing
machinery is affordable to the vast majority of people, no license or
credential is required, and no physical travel is needed in order to
contribute. The second rule concerns the content one can contribute to
the discourse; apart from the recognized limitations on the First
Watching the Watchdog
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Amendment- such as libel, creating a clear and present danger, or
copyright infringement- the content is, quite simply, whatever the
author wishes to post. The third rule concerns interference with
another's participation; apart from such mischief as hacking another's
site or creating denial of service attacks, no interference is possible.
Lest virtuality seem inadequate as institutional support cyberspace has no bricks and mortar buildings, no paneled meeting
rooms, no government agency overseeing it, no titled officials
administering it- it is helpful to recall Anthony Giddens's notion of
social structure as interrelated rules and resources (1984, p. xxxi),
which both enable people to act and are created by the actions they
take. In a discourse, speech is action. The blogosphere is a medium,
an existing resource which people can make use of to create their
speech acts. At the same time, the blogosphere is the outcome of those
speech acts. This is the property Giddens refers to as the duality of
structure (1984, p. 25 ff.), and which he sees as inherent in the social
system, across the board. While the blogosphere is virtual, it is no less
a real social system feature than any other institution we have
traditionally associated with the public sphere.
Moreover, the consequence of the blogosphere's technological
facilitation of a discourse (i.e., provision of institutional support for it),
is that every individual can contribute to the collective sense of the
public interest (as in Habermas, 1990, p. 203) more powerfully than
before. Clearly the very low barriers to entry- money, technical skill,
geographical constraints, temporal constraints - open the public
sphere up to greater participation. Political commentary, broadly
available to the general public, is no longer an oligopoly of the
intellectual elite, as can be readily seen in the extraordinary variety of
opinion available to anybody with a humble modem connection.
Habermas is mistaken in thinking that the ideal outcome of a
discourse is a genuine consensus. It seems unlikely that a group of
people could routinely arrive at a genuine consensus - a rational,
unforced consensus - when those people are heterophilous (see
Rogers, 1995, pp. 18-19) with regard to attitude, talent, preference,
motivation, theological belief, or existential viewpoint. As a practical
matter, there is hardly anything that everybody would agree on in a
large, complex social system such as ours in the United States. It is
difficult to image how that "rationally motivated recognition" of the
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best decision would coalesce when a consequential issue plays against
such a variegated cultural context. Therefore the goal of a discourse
is better thought of as stakeholder-neutral behavior norms and equity
in the available resources for the argumentation, without the vain
expectation of achieving an actual consensus on the decision. In that
respect, the rules Robert Alexy derived from Habennas's theoretical
explorations would seem to form a workable environment, one which
would generally be perceived as fair, and hence perceived as
legitimate. Again, to think of actual consensus as a realizable end goal
or to measure the beneficence of a discourse by how well it produces
the appearance of consensus is a profound conceptual mistake. Indeed,
Habermas himselfhas criticized the 20th century world on the grounds
that the public sphere, including the traditional mass media, often
induced the appearance of consensus without substantive agreement
on the issues (Goodnight, 1992, p. 247, 249). Rather than thinking of
the public discourse as either a completely rational and free exchange
of ideas leading to universal agreement or a subtly coercive social
control mechanism which deftly subordinates some players and
privileges others, we would do better to recognize the inherent tension
in that dichotomy which seems unavoidable in a real social world
populated by human beings (as Noelle-Neumann, 1993, p. 220 ff.
reminds us).
The key attribute implicit in Habennas's conception of a public
discourse is procedural neutrality. For it to be truly possible for
anyone to raise any question or make any assertion, regarding a public
issue, the rules for participating in the discourse must apply uniformly
to all participants. Given the foundational importance of the First
Amendment in the United States' social system, and the strict
prohibition against legislative interference in speech, we should
construe rules in this context to be mean customary behavior or,
perhaps, social acceptability, since overt regulatory controls are few
and limited. And in the vein of the critical studies perspective which includes Habermas, himself1 -we should also take note of
structural disparities which might effectively inhibit the participation
of some individuals or organizations and their ability to bring certain
ideas or viewpoints into the discourse. Clearly, a social stigma which
inhibits expression of minority viewpoints - the spiral of silence
dynamic, in other words- is a structural disparity which damages the
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rational argumentation of postttons on public questions (see
Noelle-Neumann, 1993, p. 228 on this point). In this light, the
benchmark of the discourse can be seen as the neutrality of the group
norms with regard to the content of the speech and the identity of the
speaker.
Habennas's overall project was to think through modem social
organization with the intent of identifying improvements. Goodnight
( 1992) put it in dramatic terms: the public sphere is broken, in essence
has become dysfunctional as an actual group decision-making space
but facile at producing a Potemkin village version of it, and· the
long-term goal of Habermas' s theorizing about an ideal speech
situation was aimed at rebuilding a genuinely participatory and
rational process by which questions of the public welfare can be
constructively addressed. Ironically, the occasionally chaotic, largely
and perhaps unmanageable sometimes
unmanaged far-from-equilibrium thrashing of ideas in the blogosphere has led to
the beginnings of a realization of Habermas' s ideal discourse in the
real world.

The Quality Question
While ensuring that the public sphere is open to participation and
that there are no undue barriers to people actually entering it are
important considerations regarding the legitimacy of the decisions
made in it, these conditions cannot in themselves guarantee that the
decisions reached in that space will be wise. For that reason the quality
of the speech acts themselves needs to be addressed, as well. It would
be foolish to pretend that every thought expressed in the blogosphere
was insightful, factually accurate, rational, or ethically motivated but then again, it would be foolish to pretend that about the content
distributed by the traditional news media, or about debates in
Congress, either. It will be helpful to address the issue of quality from
three separate directions: with regard to the speaker, to the reader, and
to the media system as a whole.

Competence
Given the scathingly negative estimations of the blogosphere
which have been expressed in some quarters- the characterization of
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bloggers as "salivating morons" (attributed to Lovelady in Rosen,
2005) or "parasites too stupid to realize they are killing off their hosts"
(Zerbisias, 2004), for instance- it is worth noting that the three types
of speech acts Habermas and Alexy saw as constructive in a practical
discourse are in ample supply in the blogosphere. The typology of
media criticism illustrated in the preceding chapters can be mapped
onto the Habermas typology of competent speech acts quite readily.
• accuracy: constatives
• framing and agenda-setting/gatekeeping: representatives
• journalistic practices: regulatives

The Habermas/Alexy criteria for speaker competence are only
minimally restrictive, which is in keeping with the intent of having a
maximally open discourse. As noted earlier, the criteria verge on a
tautology. A speaker whose expression falls into those categories is
competent; a competent speaker is allowed to contribute just about
anything to the discussion. Perhaps pure flaming- rude ad hominem
or adfeminam attacks on a person, with no substantive meaning other
than derogation - would fall outside the categories of constatives,
representatives, and regulatives, and thus indicate an incompetent
speaker who need not be taken seriously in the discourse.
But two things seem obvious, then. First, although the term
flaming originated in the realm of computer-mediated communication,
that sort of speech act certainly occurs in real life as often as in virtual
life, and occurred in real life before virtual life existed; hence, the
existence of flaming (i.e., incompetent speech) in the blogosphere
does not disqualify the blogosphere, in itself. Second, it is clear that a
large proportion of speech acts in the blogosphere are constatives,
representatives, or regulatives, however heterodox the assertions they
make or problematics they raise may be; hence, the authors of that
content are, by definition, competent speakers who have a legitimate
place in the discourse. In short, those who would broadly exclude
bloggers from the public discourse, or maintain that the blogosphere
is not a legitimate component of the public sphere, have no grounds
for doing so.
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Cocooning
A different sort of concern pertains to the consumers of blogs,
those readers who come to rely on the blogosphere as an alternative to
the traditional news media. It is possible that some readers will
"cocoon" themselves with their use ofblogs; that is to say, some users
will choose to expose themselves only to content they expect to be
congruent with their existing viewpoints, only attend to commentary
or news information which they expect to reinforce their own
predispositions on issues. Those predispositions will not be tested by
contrary evidence or argument, simply because the user is not exposed
to any. The worry, here, is twofold: the discourse as a whole will
become shallower because the readers' understanding of issues will
become one-dimensional, and that the larger discourse community
(i.e., the general public) will fragment into small niches of like-minded
readers with little interaction among them.
The first would seem, on the face of it, to be a harm which blogs
are likely to bring about. We should note, however, that there is
nothing truly different about this concern with the introduction of
blogs into the media mix. A person who relied on only a single source
in the traditional media, as a matter of habit - say only National
Public Radio, or only CBS News, or only The New York Times, or
only National Review- would be cocooned in exactly the same
fashion as a person who only attended to Red State or The Daily Kos.
In short, this is not an effect of blogs, but rather, a longstanding
concern about the public discourse. Indeed, critical theorists bemoaned
the "manufactured consent" produced by the traditional, mainstream
media long before hypertext was devised.
In fact, there are features of the blogosphere which would tend to
mitigate the cocoon problem in ways that are entirely new. Blogrolls
are a common feature; they consist of a collection of hyperlinks to
other web logs, usually formatted as a table running down the margin
of the page. While it is true that some bloggers only provide links to
like-minded sites, many bloggers do provide links to material with
noticeably different points of view from their own. The blogrolls on
Belgravia Dispatch, OxBlog, Balloon Juice, TigerHawk, and Gay
Patriot would be good examples. Further, we should note that the
convenience, to the readers, of hyper links to other content sources is
far greater than the mere availability of a different newspaper
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downtown, or the technical capability of recording and later viewing
another network's newscast at a later time. The reader's ability to
obtain more sources of news and commentary has not been
diminished; if anything, the ability to do so has been made easier and
far more convenient.
Moreover, the common blog practice of critiquing another
outlet's material brings that other material into a reader's
consciousness, out of necessity. The style of rebuttal called fisking, in
particular, reproduces excerpts of a text the blogger disagrees with.
The reader is incidentally exposed to that other material; should those ·
ideas happen to be persuasive to the reader, a hyperlink typically leads
directly to the other text. There is no comparable feature in the
traditional media. While a newspaper or television broadcast may
occasionally credit a report from another outlet, it does not typically
reproduce substantial portions of that report nor provide instant access
to it. If anything, blogs may actually mitigate a reader's tendency to
cocoon, simply as a technologically-enabled feature of the genre. It is
clear, even in the early stages of the blogosphere's evolution, that
many serious blogs do expose their readers to multiple points of view,
if only to critique them.
Some critics of the blogosphere have pointed to the occasional
blogswarms (a relatively large number of bloggers posting on a
particular topic, with a relatively high degree of congruence in their
viewpoints) as an indicator of shallow thinking, rush to judgment, or
conformity. While it certainly is possible that bloggers can be shallow,
impulsive, or mindlessly imitative, the existence of blogswarms now
and then is not sufficient to support a blanket characterization of
bloggers in those terms. If it were, then one would likewise have to
dismiss the mainstream media outlets for the frequent episodes of pack
journalism, and for the routine echoing of each other's reporting.
We should, however, note two potential problems related to the
blogosphere. One is the problem Noelle-Neumann referred to as
pluralistic ignorance (1993, p. 169), the condition in which people
come to have a substantially distorted sense of the general public
opinion. In the spiral of silence dynamic, an erroneous perception of
consensus may inhibit some individuals' participation in a public
debate. It is conceivable, at least, that blog cocooning might be a
contributing factor to pluralistic ignorance, but again, this is not a
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concern which first arose with the appearance of blogs.
Noelle-Neumann's empirical work identified times when the
traditional media seem to have contributed to a condition of pluralistic
ignorance. Rather than leading readers to inaccurately perceive
themselves to hold a minority opinion- that is, underestimate the
degree to which their own points of view are prevalent among the
general public- blog cocooning is more likely, if anything, to lead
readers to overestimate the degree to which their opinions are shared
by others.
Some observers have worried that the cumulative effect of
individuals cocooning (in the sense of buffering themselves from
exposure to viewpoints inconsistent with their own predispositions)
could be a general polarization of groups toward the extremes of the
opinion spectrum (for example, Sunnstein, 2002, pp. 185-186),
possibly leading to some sort of overall social breakdown. This
concern rests on empirical findings that homogeneous groups tend to
migrate to the extreme of their shared viewpoint (Sunnstein, 2002, p.
176).
While the doomsday scenario cannot be dismissed out of hand,
it seems Jess likely that the blogosphere will suppress viewpoint
heterogeneity, across the entire discourse community, than it will
foster it. Two dimensions of the blogosphere are especially relevant
here, considered from the point of view of an individual consumer of
mediated news and opinion. One is that the convenience of hypertext
linking increases the chances that an individual will at least be exposed
to opinions challenging his or her own; even if a person tends to reject
those opinions, at least he or she is aware of their existence. This is
apparent when one considers the greatly increased choices of content
available through computer mediation compared with the restricted
choices available through the traditional mass media. The second
concerns the individual's sense of belonging or being isolated, with
regard to viewpoint- a perception which Noelle-Neumann found to
often be inaccurate. The direction of the inaccurate sense of popular
opinion is crucial to the individual's choice to be silent or to
participate in the discourse, since it is perceiving oneself to be in the
minority opinion (i.e., an out group) which leads one to withdraw from
the discourse. In contrast, ifblog cocooning gives a reader a somewhat
inaccurate sense that his/her opinions are mainstream, that reader will
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be more comfortable with giving expression to those opinions, rather
than less comfortable. In sum, ifblogs loosen readers' tongues, it is a
beneficial effect rather than a harmful one to the public discourse as
a whole.
The second problem is perhaps a more serious concern associated
with cocooning. This is the possible fragmenting of the
communication community (presumably, the entire public) into
narrow affinity groups which have little interaction with each other, or
- worse - do not recognize each other as competent speakers or
fellow stakeholders, at all. Should this happen to a significant extent,
the harm to a system of representative democracy seems obvious: the
political process by which conflicts are supposed to be negotiated
degenerates into a spoils system for interest groups. If we take as
axiomatic, for the purpose of examining this concern, the Habennas
principle that the legitimacy of the political process rests on the
decisions being "grounded in consensus of the participants through
argumentation" (1975, p. 105), then it would seem any further impetus
from the blogosphere in this direction could be a negative effect,
indeed. The longstanding influence of special-interest lobbyists and
single-issue advocacy groups on the legislative process is strong
evidence that the problem predates blogs, but that in itself does not
reassure us that blogs will not exacerbate the existing problem.
Perhaps the key to analyzing this concern lies in the conception
ofthe communication community, itself. As noted a little earlier, the
concept verges on tautology when pushed into service as a normative
ideal. The goal of the ideal discourse is to foster a consensus (on a
particular set of ideas) among the members of the communication
community. The ideal communication community would include
anybody potentially affected by the decision made in the discourse.
The membership of the communication community is thus bounded
by their interest in participating in the discourse, which implies at least
some degree of concurrence (at least with regard to the group norms
for participating - regulatives, in other words) with the consensus
which appears to be evolving. In metaphorical language, showing up
to play the game implies acceptance of the rules of the game, even
though one retains the option to challenge the referee's decision as one
sees fit.
As a practical matter, there is no person who can possibly read
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everything written about every issue - be open to every speech act in
the discourse, in other words. And likewise, there is no person who
can actively participate in every debate which might conceivably
affect him or her - contribute speech acts to the discourse, in other
words. To put it bluntly, everybody cocoons to some degree as a
matter of necessity, if only to cope with the problem of information
overload. It would seem more useful, then, to think of the
communication community as bounded not by a population (i.e., a
particular collection of people) but by an ongoing dynamic of
argumentation. If so, the benefit of the blogosphere would clearly
outweigh any potential harm. The blogosphere is available to anyone
with an Internet connection, and enables anyone to participate either
as a reader or a speaker in that discourse. Moreover, debates which
develop in the blogosphere are tending to diffuse into the mainstream
media, further enriching the argumentation dynamic as a whole. In
short, while it might seem at first glance that the blogosphere might
contribute to a fracturing of the communication community through
individuals' tendency to cocoon, in practice it will tend to mitigate any
such problem rather than exacerbate it.
Again, it is a conceptual mistake to believe that an ideal discourse
will necessarily lead to consensus, and that an ideal communication
community will in time consist of group of like-minded altruists. The
disadvantages of groupthink or forced conformity include the
possibility of the community drifting toward an extreme point of view
as social acceptability comes to outweigh decision quality. Regarding
many issues about which reasonable people have substantial and
heartfelt differences, it is unlikely that a true consensus would ever
evolve. The short-term appearance of a consensus is likely to be false,
an appearance driven largely by social acceptability rather than the
actual merits of an idea or perspective. Put another way, the
appearance of a consensus, paradoxically, may better be taken as an
indicator of orthodoxy- which is to say, an indicator of a violation
of the rule against coercion, that any perspective may be critiqued
freely and any perspective may be articulated freely. Rather, an
optimal discourse will produce, regarding issues of substantial
controversy, a dissensus of respectful disagreement which is not
tainted by the constraints of social acceptability but informed by the
force of better argument and evidence. Put another way, the outcome
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of a healthy discourse is more likely to be a plurality or majority,
rather than a consensus. That of course implies that the decision will
not be uniformly pleasing to all parties with a stake in it; nonetheless,
a true plurality decision is more socially beneficial than the false
appearance of a consensus.

Bias
It is also worthwhile to consider blogs in light of the longstanding

issue of media bias. This has been a contentious debate, with at least
as much heat as light, in both scholarly circles and the popular press.
For our purposes here, we can think of media bias as some sort of
systematic distortion in the reporting and interpretation of events and
public policy decisions (Cooper, 2006b ). In simplest terms, bias is
manifest as a routinized mismatch between the mediated depictions of
reality, and reality itself. While that sounds simple enough on the face
of it, the arguments have been- and are likely to be! -endless,
about exactly what an undistorted portrayal of reality would be
(Cooper, 1994). And in itself, this interminable debate would be a fair
illustration of an issue that is unlikely to result in a genuine consensus,
a collective recognition of the most compelling combination of
argument and evidence, in the foreseeable future. Given that there is
no consensus about media bias in the traditional news outlets, it is
unsurprising that bloggers have been characterized as everything from
ignorant partisans (Rail, 2005), to "ego-gratifying rabble" (Parker,
2005), to reformers of the news industry (Bennett, 2005), to "the
future of journalism" (Drummond, 2005).
Prior chapters have detailed various sorts of media criticism
which have appeared in the blogosphere, that is, criticism of the
mainstream media contained in blogs. As might be expected,
corresponding criticism of blogs and bloggers has appeared in
mainstream outlets. It would be tempting to dismiss this exchange as
a shouting match between two competing sectors of the media
industry, but that would gloss the possibility that the entry of blogs
into the media mix has actually made reporting of events and
commentary on issues less trustworthy, on the whole, or that blogs are
untrustworthy, in general - which is what some observers have
charged. Here again, the question of media bias predates the
appearance ofblogs; there is no reason to think blogs caused the issue
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to arise, when it was not a concern before. Again, the question here is
whether blogs have contributed to any existing media bias, or whether
they might have - contrary to emphatic pronouncements in some
quarters- actually mitigated existing media bias.
Perhaps the most productive way to approach that question is to
first consider the degree to which the traditional news media can be
considered objective, that is, to be free of the distortion or slant which
has come to be called media bias. In a sense, this gives a baseline
indicator against which any change induced by blogs can be observed.
As an indicator of how far from consensus even this limited question
is, scholarly opinion of media bias- prior to the emergence of the
blogosphere in the media mix - ranges from an assessment of the
traditional media as leaning rightward (e.g., Herman & Chomsky,
1988) to leaning leftward (Kuypers, 2002); indeed, there is not even
a modest degree of concurrence, among the folks who make a living
studying media or commenting on them, about what facts might
constitute relevant evidence in weighing the answer to the question
(see Cooper, 2006b; Cooper, 1994).
That said, we will take as axiomatic the impossibility of any
journalism, in any channel, being universally acclaimed as objective
-in the sense of being perceived as a perfectly transparent vehicle by
which reality is conveyed across distance and time. This is not to say
that the issue is irrelevant; clearly, the degree of coloration in the
mediated accounts of reality matters, as does the political or economic
interests such coloration may favor or disfavor. But just as it seems a
vain hope that a perfect discourse on a contentious issue will lead, in
the end, to a universally-shared sense of the best ideas about it, it
likewise seems vain to expect any single news outlet to attain an ideal
of objectivity, if we take objectivity to mean irreproachable fidelity of
its products to reality.
A more modest, ostensibly attainable, goal is that journalism
might be balanced, in the sense of neutral to all parties engaged in an
issue and perceived by at least most of the readers as being fair to all
parties. As a vision of ideal journalism this makes good sense, but
there are also good reasons not to expect any single news outlet to
actually exhibit this trait, and, indeed, few seem to. A given news
outlet does tend to gravitate toward a certain point of view or
consistency in perspective- regardless of the merits of the competing
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positions in any given issue - if only for the sake of coherence in its
content or style. This is to be expected, for two reasons. One is that a
news outlet needs to attract and retain an audience, for the sake of
maintaining a stable source of funding for its operations. This is a need
which applies to both commercial and non-commercial outlets, such
as National Public Radio. Just as the producers of other goods in a free
marketplace establish their brand names, so do news outlets, in
practice, develop an identity of their own in a crowded marketplace of
news and commentary. To put this point quite bluntly, regarding the
need to attract and retain a stable segment of the consumer market,
there is no real difference between a private-for-profit media outlet
and a so-called "public" media outlet.
A second reason has to do with organizational culture. For the
sake of its own cohesion as a functioning organization, a news outlet
will evolve a culture, in the sense of some degree of uniformity in
values, attitudes, and practices among the organizational members.
This shared viewpoint will manifest itself in the subtle,
taken-for-granted value judgments embedded in the news content
distributed by the outlet. By no means does this necessarily reflect a
professional shortcoming on the part of newsworkers; rather, it is an
unavoidable trait of real news content created by normal human beings
working co llaboratively in organizations, content intended to be
consumed by a greatly heterogeneous public.
So if even the very highest quality news outlets tend to develop
bias, in the sense of a coloration in their depiction of reality- a point
which the former public editor of The New York Times acknowledged
about his own newspaper (Okrent, 2004c)- we ought look to the
marketplace as a whole for the desired balance of viewpoints and
perspectives, rather than any particular outlet or sector of the
marketplace. In short, the chronic problem with the media bias debate
has been a mismatch between its comparatively narrow scope and the
actual breadth of the social phenomenon it attempts to encompass.
What to make, then, of the bloggers, with their overtly
personalized content, their often-irreverent style, and their overtly
viewpoint-centered ethos? Some have argued that despite the
mainstream media's professed standard of objectivity, as a
professional value of journalism, there often seems to be preferential
treatment of certain causes, ideas, or actors (e.g., Kuypers, 2002),
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perhaps attributable to the socialization process journalists experience.
In contrast, bloggers as a population are wildly heterogeneous with
regard to the practices, assumptions, and world views which tend to be
relatively uniform among professional journalists (see Lichter,
Rothman, & Lichter, 1990). While many bloggers say explicitly that
they are only expressing their individual viewpoints, across the entire
blogosphere there is a very broad and deep heterogeneity of
perspectives, arguably far greater than that found among the
traditional media outlets. Paradoxically, the subjective viewpoints of
individual bloggers accumulate into a social object enacting the kind
of multi-perspective objectivity promised, but not actually delivered,
by the mainstream media.
If this author is correct in thinking that any process of writing an
account of events or in suggesting interpretations of an event is
inherently viewpoint-centered and any depiction of reality is
inherently shaped by the fmite awareness and predispositions of the
author (see Kuypers & Cooper, 2005, for an example), the idea that
any single account can attain objectivity, or that the objectivity of any
single news outlet be beyond question, is a vain hope. The key idea in
considering the effect blogs might have on the public discourse is that
the free-for-all they generate is more likely to cancel out biases in the
news marketplace than induce them. To the extent that the addition of
blogs to the media mix have moved the public sphere away from an
oligopoly and in the direction of a more strongly competitive
marketplace of ideas, they have helped neutralize whatever media bias
is attributable to the previously limited number of suppliers in that
marketplace. In short, deficiencies in the quality of products available
in the marketplace of news information goods - in this case,
deficiencies in the form of bias in the content of those products tend to be corrected by the entry of competing products from new
suppliers to that market.
An alternative way of approaching the media bias question would
be to use system theory as the analytical framework (see Demers,
1996, ch. 4 for an overview of system theory applied to the mass
media). We would then think of the media system as a subsystem of
the complete social system. Media dependency would be a condition
apparent at a number of levels in the complex social system (see
Demers, 1996, p. 83 for a concise illustration): individuals would be
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dependent on the media system for gratification of their information
needs; journalists would be dependent on various power centers for
the raw materials from which to make their news products; those
power centers would be dependent on the media for maintaining the
social stability which permits the continuance of their power.
The introduction of a new component into the media system in this case, the blogosphere- would clearly have the potential to
reduce the rigidity of all those existing interdependencies. This is not
to say that the blogosphere in itself would necessarily remain a
permanent outsider to the web of interdependencies; that would seem
quite unlikely, since as the blogosphere matures into a social object it
will, by definition, become an established part of the social structure.
But what the blogosphere may indeed do, long term, is to mitigate the
severity of those dependencies throughout the entire social system,
simply by offering alternative means of gratifying the various
information needs of the various social actors.
In short, we might expect the increase in the complexity of the
media system brought about by the introduction of the blogosphere to
precipitate a corresponding reduction in the strength of media
dependencies across the entire social system- at both the individual
and institutional levels. And in tum, we might expect the degree of
bias in media content attributable to the dependency of any social
actors on any other actors to be attenuated, over time.

Quantity and Quality, Both
So we can break the issue of the beneficence of the blogosphere,
with regard to the social system, into two parts: the quantity of
participation, and the quality of the participation. Regarding quantity,
the question would be, is the blogosphere providing a new level of
support for entry into the discourse? This author's answer is, yes = decisively. It is easier now than it ever has been, for ordinary people
to take part in the interpretation of events or debates over public
policy. They can easily raise their questions, make their assertions, or
express their concerns about any question in the public spherej 'r~hey
can easily expose themselves to the unfiltered opinions of their peers~
without the gatekeeping or intervention of a professional elite,
Regarding the quality of the discourse, the question would be~ tire
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those new viewpoints being brought into the discourse constructive
additions to it? This author's answer is, yes, overall. This is not to say
that every post or every blog is a constructive addition, but rather to
say that the blogosphere as a social object is a constructive addition.
Earlier chapters described many examples of substantive and
thoughtful contributions, in the form of constructive criticism of the
mainstream media, or alternative media products. Moreover, the
public discourse is simply a more competitive marketplace of ideas for
the new entrants into it; we have taken another step closer to that
vigorous and free-ranging process of argumentation envisioned as an
ideal.
Clearly the emergence of the blogosphere as a social feature has
made that argumentation more raucous! It also seems clear that the
outcome of the argumentation is more often a reasoned - if
sometimes sullen - disagreement than a consensus. But if the
quintessential critical question is "Whom does this discourse serve?"
(Foucault, 1981, p. 115; Moore, 1997), the key point is that the
blogosphere has opened up the discourse, apparently contrary to the
preferences of some of the current actors, to newcomers with
heterodox viewpoints. In that light, the discourse is the better for the
emergence of the blogosphere.
Quite simply, the blogosphere exists because it fills a need. It was
not brought into being by fiat; it evolved through the accumulation of
individual acts. The many people who find it worth their investment
in time and effort to create blog content surely do it because they fmd
it fills a need for expression, for giving voice to their thoughts, in a
way the previous outlets available to them did not. So, too, does the
blogosphere fill a need for those who read the content, and participate
in discussion by adding their comments. In this sense, then, the
blogosphere represents a vox populi the technology did not determine,
but did, instead, facilitate. This is clearly a free market perspective on
the blogosphere; the author finds it the most satisfying understanding
of it.
Probably the critical theorists, as a school of thought, would be
discomfited by the notion that a blatantly commercial marketplace in
communication technology has facilitated the evolution of a genre of
computer-mediated communication (viz., blogs) with such a
relentlessly individualist ethos, yet having such a clear public benefit.
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Probably they would not have expected that a genre with such
inconsequential roots (viz., personal web pages) could have opened up
public discourse to a collective level only considered a theoretical
ideal. Probably they would have assumed that even an approximation
of that ideal discourse could come into being only through some sort
of concerted political action, not through the accumulation of
voluntary interactions in a decentralized, unmanaged virtual space.
Yet, that is precisely what has happened.
This author is inclined to think that social structures which evolve
through the voluntary interactions and exchanges among people such as the blogosphere- tend in general to be more beneficial than
structures created through the deliberate exercise of power, however
well-intentioned- such as regulatory bureaucracies. That idea cannot
be fully explored here. For our purposes, we can simply note that the
b logosphere would seem to be a near-perfect instantiation of the ideal
discourse.
Real life can often be a pleasant surprise. And that is a good thing
about it.
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